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ABSTRACT
Reform of the telecommunications sector has been a worldwide policy trend since the United
States, the United Kingdom and Japan drastically reorganized their domestic industries in the
early 1980s. Competition has been introduced into a previously monopolistic
telecommunications market by many developing as well as industrialized countries. In earlier
periods, however, telecommunications monopolies effectively developed national
telecommunications networks. Rushing to break up the monopolies could potentially involve
certain risks unless it is done at the right moment and in the proper manner.
By analyzing history, institutions and performance indicators for the telecommunications
sectors in several countries, we show that institutional issue such as ownership does not affect
the performance of the telecommunications sectors as much as is widely believed. Rather, a
country's economy, an enterprise's autonomy and a government's attitude determine
performance. Based on these findings, this thesis presents policy recommendations to foster
the healthy growth of telecommunications in developing countries.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, telecommunications reform has become a leading policy issue in every
part of the world, regardless of a country' s economic scale. The divestiture of the American
Telephone and Telegraph in the United States and the privatization of British Telecom in the
United Kingdom in 1984, followed by the privatization of the Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation in Japan in 1985, became examples for other nations to follow.
These reforms are considered successful and effective at improving the performance of
telecommunications enterprises. The number of countries working to reform these sectors has
been growing. For instance, in Latin America, countries such as Argentina, Chile, Mexico and
Venezuela, have privatized their telecommunications enterprises, which were formerly owned
by those countries' governments. In Europe, Deutsche Bundespost Telekom became a joint-
stock company in Germany in 1995 and France is planning to privatize France T616com. It
seems that nothing can stop this trend of reform in the telecommunications sector.
However, it should not be forgotten that the old-fashioned government monopoly was in
fact effective at least in the early stages of telecommunications development, as a century of
telecommunications development history in industrialized countries shows. We should also be
aware that there are probably certain limitations in any kind of reform. Moreover, we do not yet
know the final results of reforms that were carried out in the 1980s. Therefore, in order to
implement a successful policy reform, recognizing what possible changes the reform will
actually bring to a country's existing telecommunications system, is essential.
To consider effective policy to support the growth of telecommunications for developing
countries, the key question addressed in this thesis is how institutions affect the performance of
telecommunications sectors. The hypothesis of this thesis is that what determines the
performance of the telecommunications sector is not institutional issues including ownership or
regulation as is widely believed, but issues that are particular to the case in question, such as
the autonomy of the financial and managerial aspects of the enterprise, isolation of the
enterprise from political pressure, and the government' s general attitude to telecommunications.
To examine this hypothesis, we first review why regulation is necessary for
telecommunications. Next, a historical survey of telecommunications development in selected
countries, mostly industrialized nations, will be presented. Then, the performance of
telecommunications sectors will be examined. Finally, policy recommendations for developing
countries will be presented.

2 Telecommunications Regulatory
Frameworks
Regulations are imposed on business activities, including telecommunications, for
various reasons. Price regulation, entry regulation and universal service obligation, for
instance, are imposed on the telecommunications industry in many countries.
Regulations usually fall into two categories concerning their functions: social regulation
and economic regulation, although both are not always clearly distinguished. On the one hand,
social regulations exist to secure public health or safety. On the other hand, a goal of economic
regulations is to achieve economic efficiency.
The measures to realize these goals differ for social and economic regulations; however,
the ultimate objective should be to work for an increase of benefits for the public. Of those
regulations imposed on telecommunications sectors, price regulation and entry regulation are
categorized as economic regulation. The universal service obligation, however, is a mixture of
social and economic regulations.
What those regulations should be in the 1990s, has been and still is discussed
intensively. As we will see in Chapter 3, the telecommunications sector has traditionally been
tightly regulated in many countries. However, reforms including deregulation, liberalization,
corporatization and privatization have been not only discussed but also actually carried out in
some of the developed countries, led by the United States and the United Kingdom in the early
1980s. The trend of telecommunications reform was followed by a number of developing
countries.
However, when considering the economic nature of the telecommunications industry,
some regulations are in fact necessary, whereas some are existing just because of historical
reasons and are no longer necessary. Therefore, distinguishing between necessary regulations
and unnecessary ones is essential for planning and implementing any telecommunications
reform. In this chapter, we will review why telecommunications requires certain regulations.
2.1 The Need for Regulation
Several economic reasons could justify the regulation of telecommunications. If the
market mechanisms function perfectly, no regulation would be the preferred choice. By
competing with each other, any number of private telecommunications companies could
provide services in the most efficient way; simultaneously, consumers would gain the
maximum benefit from this competition. However, the telecommunications industry is in fact a
far from perfect market. In addition, even perfect markets do not always lead to allocative
efficiency, given the right circumstances, otherwise known as market failure.
Distance from Perfect Market
Ultimate objective of economic regulation is to achieve economic efficiency, a condition
where the allocation of resources reach a certain optimum level. In other words, it is a situation
where no one could benefit more without reallocating resources and worsen someone else's
situation. This condition is known as Pareto optimum (Cullis & Jones, 1987, pp.5--13).
Under certain ideal assumptions, economic efficiency can be achieved only by means of
pure competition through a perfect market: people' s actions, seeking to improve just their own
profits, will allocate the resources in the most efficient way (Cullis & Jones, 1987, p.4).
However, assumptions required for the perfect market are too strict to be realized: all of
the producers in the industry have to make a homogenous good by means of an identical
production process; there have to be many producers and consumers; complete information
regarding the industry has to be shared by all producers and consumers; and free entry and exit
to the industry have to be also assured (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1995, pp.27 1-272).
Most of the industries, including telecommunications, do not satisfy these assumptions
and thus their markets are considered far from perfect. Therefore, achieving economic
efficiency by only depending on market mechanisms for most of the industries may be very
difficult or almost impossible.
Market Failure
Moreover, even when all the assumptions for perfect markets are held and thus a market
is considered perfect, achieving economic efficiency through the market is difficult for numbers
of reasons. This is known as market failure, the market would be not fully functioning and
hence the products would not be provided at optimal level under certain circumstances (Cullis
& Jones, 1987, p. 14). The sources of market failure are the existence of natural monopolies,
incomplete information, externalities and public goods. If these are present, some measure is
necessary to help the market work properly.
Natural Monopoly
When there is only one producer in the industry for any reason, the producer is called a
monopolist. The market monopolized by such a producer is called a monopolistic market. In
such an industry, the monopolist can maximize its profit by selling products at higher prices
than would be possible in a competitive market. This is achieved by reducing the quantity of
products available. In general, the monopoly is considered harmful because it most likely
exploits the consumers. That is why the Sherman Antitrust Act was established in the United
States, which prohibits monopolies. However, as we will see later, a monopoly is considered
desirable and justified under certain conditions known as a natural monopoly, under which a
market will necessarily fail.
A natural monopoly is probably the most cited reason to justify a monopoly in certain
kinds of industries such as public utilities (Sharkey, 1982, pp.147-151; Duch, 1991, pp.12-
14). A monopoly is usually considered harmful because of its power to control prices,
resulting in exploitation of consumers. However, a natural monopoly is allowed because it can
provide the products at the lowest cost--with relevant regulation. For instance, the Japanese
Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Act exclude explicitly its application to the production, sales and
supply of certain kinds of industries: railways, electricity and gas - utilities. Water supply and
canal operation are exempted implicitly. A natural monopoly is clearly stated as a reason for the
act of exclusion of these industries (Antimonopoly and Fare Trade Act, Article 21).
A natural monopoly is justified when there is cost subadditivity, a term that will be
explained below, within the industry in question. In such an industry, larger firms can always
produce at lower cost and thus can sell at lower prices than smaller firms can. Not being able to
compete with larger firms, smaller firms will go out of business or be acquired by larger firms.
Eventually, this industry will be solely occupied by the winner, or the natural monopolist.
As this process of selection is inevitable for industries in which the presence of cost
subadditivity is known, allowing a monopoly is the most desirable from the outset. This is
mainly because the products can be provided at lower cost by a natural monopolist than by
many different firms, and because the duplicate investment in facilities by the firms can be
avoided. However, unlike a competitive market where the price of a product is equated to the
marginal cost of its production, the monopolist, regardless of whether it is natural or artificial,
can raise the price of products to above the marginal cost. This justifies a private monopoly
with regulation or a public monopoly.
Cost Subadditivity
An industry will be subject to natural monopoly, when the industry's production cost
structure shows subadditivity. Assuming that all the producers in a given industry have the
same cost function C(q) where q equals the units of products, cost subadditivity exists when
the following condition is satisfied:
C(Q) < C(q,) + C(q2) + ... + C(q,) (2.1)
where Q= q, + q2 + ... + q.
This implies that producing Q units would cost less if all the products would be made by
only one firm rather than by many firms producing smaller numbers of units.
The condition (2.1) is easily expanded for the multi-product case, simply replacing scalar
by vector, representing outputs.
C(Q) < C(ql) + C(q 2) + ... + C(q,) (2.2)
where Q = q, + q2 + ... + q,
In single and multi-product cases alike, cost subadditivity is a necessary and sufficient
condition for a natural monopoly (Sharkey, 1982, p.58; p.64). Even though it is
mathematically simple, cost subadditivity is not easily verified in reality. Therefore, when
discussing a natural monopoly, concepts of economies of scale or scope are used to verify
subadditivity of the industry in question (Sharkey, 1982, p.56).
Economies of Scale
Natural monopolies will occur in the presence of economies of scale. When the increase
in cost is less than the ratio of increased output quantity, economies of scale are said to exist.
Mathematically, this is expressed as:
C(q2) / C(q,) < q2 / q, (q1 < q2) (2.3)
This can be interpreted as a decreasing average cost of production:
C(q,) / q, > C(q,) / q2  (q1 < q2) (2.4)
Suppose that the i-th firm would produce %q units, then
C(Q) / Q< C(q) / q (2.5)
q% * C(Q) / Q < I C(q) (2.6)
C(Q) < I C(q) (2.7)
Since the last equation is the same as (2.1), we can conclude that economies of scale are a
sufficient condition for cost subadditivity. Notice that since the only condition to make (2.7)
valid is (2.5), (2.4) is not necessarily kept for all of the range of q. Therefore, economies of
scale are not a necessary condition for cost subadditivity.
Economies of Scope
When various kinds of products can be produced more inexpensively by only one
producer than by numbers of producers, it is said that there are economies of scope (Stehmann,
1995, 46). We should be aware that there is no direct relationship between economies of scale
and economies of scope (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1995, p.218).
We assume that the amount of Q1 and Q, are produced for the product 1 and 2,
respectively. The condition for economies of scopes is written as:
C(Q1,, Q) < C(Q 1, 0) + C(0, Q) (2.8)
Since this condition is a special case of (2.2), as we can easily examine, economies of
scope are a necessary condition for cost subadditivity.' Economies of scope usually exist when
input can be used to create two or more final products in a complementary fashion.
Incomplete Information
When the pertinent information regarding products, such as quality or true value, is not
open to consumers, they cannot make proper decisions on purchasing the products.
Consequently, products of lower quality tend to be supplied and purchased. This will result in
wide diffusion of low quality products. A similar problem will also occur when only the
consumers have accurate information, as in the case of buying life insurance. Both will
eventually lead to market failure (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1995, p.594).
Externalities
Externalities are any action by firms or consumers that affect the behavior of other
producers or consumers, but not through market activity. As the externality is not incorporated
in the market mechanism, market failure will occur. The price and quantity of the products
determined by the market do not properly reflect the true demand and supply. This is due to
disregarding external effects. As a result, the products will be supplied in quantities less or
more than consumers are actually demanding (Cullis & Jones, 1987, p. 14-17).
Public Goods
A good that is both nonrival and nonexclusive is called a public good. If the marginal cost
of producing the good is zero, the good is called nonrival. When any group of people cannot
be excluded from consuming the good, it is called nonexclusive. Market failure will happen
because the supply will be insufficient due to difficulty in charging everyone who benefits from
public goods (Cullis & Jones, 1987, pp.18-21).
Sufficient condition for cost subadditivity in the multi-product case is much more complicated than in single-
product cases. For further discussion of sufficient conditions, see Sharkey (1982, pp.67-73).
2.2 Economic Properties of Telecommunications
In this section, we will examine how we can apply the general discussion from the
previous section to telecommunications.
Natural Monopoly and Telecommunications
The question whether or not telecommunications is subject to a natural monopoly, is an
essential issue to telecommunications regulations. Exploring the status of telecommunications
requires us to examine cost subadditivity in the telecommunications industry; however, this is
not very easy to accomplish. A number of studies have been carried out to examine the
rationale for a natural monopoly. However, there is very little evidence to support the existence
of natural monopoly characteristics in the telecommunications industry.
Stehmann (1995, p.50) concludes that "little empirical evidence could be found for a
natural monopoly in telecommunications networks." In a survey of past studies one can find
the following: On the one hand, Waverman concludes that there were neither significant
economies of scale nor scope, examining AT&T during the period 1947-77 (cited in
Stehmann, 1995, p.49). On the other hand, some studies ascertain the existence of a natural
monopoly only in a part of the networks. As for the United Kingdom, Hunt and Lynk studied
the telephone department of the Post Office, the forerunner of the British Telecom, during
1951-81. They found that there was subadditivity in the local networks (cited in Stehmann,
1995, p.49). A study of Intelsat by Snow proved the existence of cost subadditivity networks
(cited in Stehmann, 1995, p.49).
Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994, p.200) conclude that "there is no strong reason to
expect significant natural monopoly in the supply or manufacture of apparatus or in the supply
of services over a network, but aspects of network operation and construction may be naturally
monopolistic to a degree." Examining several studies, they summarize that the empirical
evidence on natural monopoly in networks operation is mixed: Evans and Heckman, and Hunt
and Lynk find evidence to support the hypothesis that prior to divestiture, the Bell network in
the United States was not a natural monopoly, whereas Roller reaches the opposite conclusion;
Shin and Ying argued that the regional networks in the United States are not natural
monopolies (cited in Armstrong, Cowan & Vickers, 1994, p.200).
The fact that many conclusions were mixed, may tell us that not enough data is available
to show the existence of economies of scale. When considering economies of scope,
discussions regarding natural monopoly would be more difficult. If there were diseconomies of
scale, the effect of economies of scope might be offset. There is little persuasive reason to
believe that telecommunications are subject to a natural monopoly. However, partial natural
monopoly may be recognized when considering particular parts of the networks.
Externalities and Telecommunications
Telecommunications definitely has the characteristic of network externality. The more
telephones there are, the more the subscribers benefit. However, because the social benefit is
not reflected in the price, supply of telephone lines, if determined by the market, will be fewer
than people would demand. This affects the network' s growth in two stages of the
telecommunications development: One effect can be seen in the infancy stage, the other in the
mature stage (Figure 2.1).
Even without considering social benefits, certain subsidies or regulations are necessary
until "critical mass" point and after the "exit" point (Noam, 1994, pp.19-25). However, if we
allow for the social benefit as an externality, more government intervention would be necessary
to increase the number of telephones in both stages.
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Figure 2.1 Effect of Network Externality
Source: Adapted from Noam, 1995, p. 19.
In the early stage of development, the benefit from using telephones is minimal because
there are few people to whom one could talk. Thus the subscribers receive fewer benefits than
they are expecting from their investments in the telephone. As a result, fewer telephone lines
will be supplied than desired. Until reaching the critical mass, development of telephone
networks requires subsidies. As shown in Figure 2.1, an actual critical mass point, C, would
be underestimated as C', if not considering the external social benefit as a network externality.
Once the number of telephones is raised to the critical mass level, by government subsidy
or by charging an expensive installation fee, the number of subscribers will be increased
automatically, because the benefit from using a telephone is more than the marginal cost of
providing telephone lines. After the critical mass point, people become willing to pay for the
telephones.
An actual exit point, E, is more than the level determined by demand, E' (Figure 2.1).
Thus, to raise the number of lines, a so-called universal service obligation is necessary.
Without this obligation, private enterprise might not serve unprofitable areas such as remote
islands or less populated regions.
Therefore, pertinent actions by regulators are required to sustain the development of
telephone networks, both in the initial and final stage of telephone network evolution.
Other Considerations
The telecommunications infrastructure is considered to have a nonexclusive nature;
however, it is not regarded as a public good in the exact sense of the term, because the
marginal cost of service provision does not equal zero. Incomplete information may apply to
telecommunications because the exact cost of a telephone call is not open to the consumers.
Although it is not necessarily connected to market failure, sunk costs are worth
mentioning here because they are usually large in the telecommunications industry. Sunk costs
are the investments that cannot be recovered when quitting the business. This is different from
fixed costs, which is any fixed amount of investment during business. The fixed costs may or
may not be recovered afterwards. Sunk costs are usually large for the telecommunications
industry, because most of the telecommunications facility, including telephone lines and
exchange machines, cannot be used for purposes other than telecommunications. Moreover,
such a facility is usually expensive. Therefore, unless new investors are wishing to inherit the
facility, the initial investment will be a sunk cost. It is widely believed that allowing a
monopoly is appropriate in an industry like telecommunications, which has a large sunk cost,
in order to avoid multiple investments (Stehmann, 1995, p.58).
2.3 Regulation of Telecommunications
As we saw, theoretically, the industry with the characteristic of natural monopoly will be
dominated by the monopolist. Therefore, the capital that cannot be recovered and was invested
by the dropped-out firms might be considered wasted unless assets could be inherited by the
winner, the monopolist. Moreover, without any regulation, the monopolist might abuse the
market by using its strong market power. These are the reasons for the regulations for entry
and price. In the case of private ownership, regulations are often strict. Alternatively, public
ownership is a solution in many countries, although it is not an economic consequence of
natural monopolies.
Entry Regulation
Theoretically, because of competition in the industry subject to natural monopoly, only
one firm will remain, as already mentioned. Investments in the facility by a firm other than the
winner, will be redundant, if the costs cannot be recovered. Therefore, some form of entry
regulation is imposed on the industry with the natural monopoly in order to avoid the social
loss of duplicate investment in advance (Stehmann, 1995, p.57). These entry regulation may
be by franchise, concession or license as we will see later in Chapter 3.
Price Regulation
In the case of perfect competition, an individual enterprise does not have the power to
control the price. The price and quantity of the products is determined by the demand and
supply balance. Under the perfect competition condition, firms will adjust their output in such a
way that the marginal cost is equal to the price. This assures maximum profits for the firms and
maximum benefits for the consumers at the same time.
However, because the monopolist has the power to control the price and the output as
well, equating the marginal cost and the marginal revenue will result in higher price and lower
output than in the competitive market.
This will bring excessive profit to the monopolist. Consumers will suffer most from lost
benefits. Therefore, pertinent price regulation is necessary, because there is no incentive for the
monopolist to reduce the price (Armstrong, Cowan & Vickers, pp.39-44).
Marginal Cost Pricing
The best solution is to impose marginal cost pricing on the monopolist, because this will
achieve economic efficiency in the sense that no dead weight loss will occur (Armstrong,
Cowan & Vickers, 1994, pp.14-16, pp.49-50).
However, in the industry subject to a natural monopoly, a firm always has losses under
marginal cost pricing. The profit for the firm can be described as:
x = q(p) * p - c(q(p)) (2.9)
Break-even price will be obtained by letting x = 0O
p = c(q(p)) / q(p) = AC (2.10)
In a natural monopoly, the marginal cost of production is always below the average cost,
AC. Therefore, the monopolist will inevitably have a loss with marginal cost pricing. A
government subsidy would be necessary to cover the production cost of the monopolist.
Rate-of-Return Regulation
Rate-of-return regulation is a way to determine the price based on a fair return on an
investment. Usually, the price is determined by the following formula under the rate-of-return
regulation (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1995, p.344):
P = AVC + (D+ T + s * K) /Q (2.11)
where AVC: Average variable cost of production
D: Depreciation, T: Taxes
s: Rate-of-return, K: Capital stock
In many countries, the rate-of-return regulation has been widely used to decide the price
for public utilities because of its ease of use (Saunders, Warford & Wellenius, 1994, p.259). It
is very easy to understand the principle and calculate the price. In addition, the price assures
public utility companies to recover their huge sunk costs. In Japan, the prices for
telecommunications are based on the rate-of-return principle (Telecommunications Business
Law, Article 31). Before the regulatory reforms, rate-of-return regulation had been used for
telecommunications in the United States and the United Kingdom (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988,
p.204; pp.205-208).
Nevertheless, there are also disadvantages. First, because the price depends on the capital
stock, the firm tends to make excessive investments in unnecessary facilities. Second, because
knowing the exact cost of a particular product is usually difficult for the regulator, the price
involves a certain degree of arbitrariness, which is advantageous for the firm. Third, increases
in the costs, regardless of internal or external reasons, can easily be rolled over to the price.
Altogether, there is very little incentive to improve internal efficiency under rate-of-return
regulations (Saunders, Warford & Wellenius, 1994, p.296; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988, pp.82-
85).
2.4 Organizational Variations
Telecommunications enterprises could be categorized into either public or private in terms
of ownership. However, as there are many variants between pure public and pure private,
classifying the ownership of a particular enterprise is often difficult.
When a business entity is a government department or agency, public ownership is clear.
It is also true for the case of a public corporation, which is often totally owned by the
government but separated from the government body. In the case of joint-stock corporations,
stock shares will determine the ownership.
AT&T is clearly a private company, whose shares are entirely held by the private sector.
NTT in Japan was said to be privatized in 1985; however, the government still holds two thirds
of its stock. Telef6nica in Spain is neither a pure private company nor a public corporation. It is
reasonable to refer to NTT, Telef6nica and others like them, as semi-private companies.
Table 2.1 Government Shares in the Selected Telecommunications Enterprises
Country Company Government Share (%)
US AT&T 0.0
Japan NTT 65.57
UK British Telecom 0.0
France France Tl66com 100.0
Germany DBP Telekom 100.0
Spain Telef6nica 32.0
Mexico TELMEX 4.8
Source: Toyo Keizai Database, Wellenius & Stern (1994), Petrazzini (1995), Duch (1991).
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Figure 2.2 Private-Public Spectrum
Within the public-private spectrum, it is convenient to place categories like public
corporation and semi-private enterprise.
* Government Agency
In the case of telecommunications, a government agency itself quite often carries
out business. Being within government, a business entity typically has less autonomy
regarding financial and management issues (Duch, 1991, p.43). Traditional European
PTTs are examples of government agencies providing telecommunications services.
* Public Corporation
A public corporation is an entity separated from the government body. Therefore, it
has more autonomy than a government agency does. A public corporation is often
subject to a special law as well as to general business law. Tax is often exempted.
British Telecom before privatization is an example of a public corporation.
* Semi-private Enterprise
A semi-private enterprise is somewhere between a public corporation and a pure
private enterprise (Duch, 1991, p.42), such as NTT in Japan or Telef6nicain Spain.
* Private Enterprise
A private enterprise is a company totally owned by the private sector as in the case
of AT&T in the United States.
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2.5 Problems with Public Ownership
Some criticize that the public sector has not kept up a good performance. Several reasons
are proposed to explain the internal problems of the publicly owned enterprise.
Principal-Agent Problem
As discussed in Chapter 2, simply pursuing profit maximization will accomplish
economic efficiency. In this sense, any enterprise has to try to maximize its profit by reducing
the production cost and increasing sales. However, within an enterprise, numbers of people are
motivated by different incentives, seeking objectives other than profit maximization. The
principal-agent problem explains this situation (Armstrong, Cowan & Vickers, 1994, pp.27-
28).
For the company where the principal (i.e., owners) and the agent (i.e., managers) are the
same, motivating a company as a whole toward profit maximization is easy, because income
for all will be raised as a direct result of their efforts toward profit maximization. However,
except in very small companies, the goals of a principal and an agent are often different,
because profit maximization does not necessarily lead to raised incomes for managers. Even
though both the owner and the managers pursue profit maximization, the actions of the
managers toward profit maximization will not always result in income maximization for the
same managers. Thus there is less incentive for profit maximization for managers, even in
private companies.
The principal-agent problem is more complicated, especially with publicly owned
enterprise: an owner's goal is quite often not profit maximization. For example, the
government tries to maximize social benefits or public interests by using the enterprise as a
political instrument, e.g., increase employment, or by offering necessities at a lower cost. In
addition to increasing social benefits, sometimes publicly owned enterprises are used to attract
public attentions and gather votes. For instance, constructing unnecessary highways in less
populated areas may be politically popular. Therefore, because the difference in objectives
between principal and agent is wider in public enterprises than in private ones, internal
inefficiency is said to occur commonly with public ownership.
X-inefficiency
Another source of internal inefficiency is called X-inefficiency. This is a situation in
which a firm's total cost is not minimized because the actual output achieved from the given
input is less than the maximum feasible level. X-inefficiency is also categorized as technical
inefficiency because it is related to the production process (Saunders, Warford & Wellenius,
1994, p.281).
For a monopolist, due to the absence of competitive pressures, a firm has little incentive
to increase productivity. In the first place, no measure for comparing productivity is available
to the monopolist. Secondly, improving productivity does not bring benefits to the monopolist
because the profit is usually assured. The consumer will suffer from higher prices as a result of
X-inefficiency. Competition is expected to improve X-inefficiency by giving incentives to
reduce the costs of production in order to stay in the market. Other than improving economic
efficiency, X-inefficiency is frequently cited as a reason for introducing competition into the
industry, which was formerly believed to be subject to a natural monopoly (Duch, 1991,
pp.90-91; Stehmann, 1995, p.51).
3 Telecommunications Development
Histories
In this chapter, we review the development history of telecommunications in selected
countries, mostly from the industrialized world, in order to examine the reasons for successful
or unsuccessful development.
3.1 The United States
Telephony in the United States was characterized by private provision from day one-
unlike most other industrialized countries. The Bell System had been expanded successfully by
protecting itself through a patent in the early years and later by rejecting connections requested
by new entrants. However, challenged by the Justice Department, AT&T was finally broken
up in 1984 (Brock, 1994, p. 168).
Early Years of Development
The history of the telephone began when Alexander Graham Bell filed his patent
application for the telephone as an "improvement in Telegraphy" to the Patent Office on
February 14, 1876. After the success in creating a workable telephone by using patented
techniques, the Bell Telephone Company was established in August 1877. In the early years of
the Bell's business, there was a competitor, the American Speaking Telephone Company,
formed in December. It was a subsidiary of Western Union, the company that had created
telegraphy networks, first with the financial support of the federal government (Oslin, 1992,
pp.217-222).
American Speaking used the technique developed by Elisa Gray, who filed the patent
application regarding the method of transmission of the human voice a little later on the same
day as Bell did, and Thomas Alvah Edison, who developed a better transmitter of the telephone
than Bell' s. American Speaking expanded its networks, taking advantage of Western Union' s
facilities (Oslin, 1992, p.222).
AT&T Monopoly
In 1878, the Bell Telephone Company sued Western Union, charging Gray infringed on
Bell' s patent. Expecting that the law suit would take much time and money, Western Union
offered a compromise to the Bell company. There had been long arguments, which included
the plan that Western Union would take long-distance and the Bell local networks. Finally, in
November 1879, both agreed that Bell would operate only telephones and Western Union only
telegrams (Oslin, 1992, p.228). In November 1879, Bell Telephone was expanded and
renamed the National Bell Telephone Company. It soon became a nationwide long-distance
company called American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), serving 240,000
telephones with 10,000 employees by the year 1892 (Oslin, 1992, p.23 1).
Until the mid-1890s, AT&T had enjoyed its monopolistic position protected by the
Patent Act. After the expiration of the patent, many new companies entered the local market.
However, refusing to open its long-distance network to local independent companies, AT&T
managed to keep its position (Noam, 1994, p.474).
The First Antitrust Case
In 1934, the Communications Act was passed. The purpose of the act was to regulate
interstate and international telecommunications and to create the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC). AT&T, as a private monopolist, operated under the FCC's supervision
(Brock, 1994, pp.49-56).
After World War II, pressures on AT&T gradually began to increase. In 1949, AT&T's
vertical integration was challenged by the Department of Justice. The antitrust case charged a
part of AT&T, monopolistic status of Western Electric in telephone and related equipment
markets, and asked for separation of Western Electric from AT&T. Insisting that Western
Electric was an integral part of AT&T, and with strong lobbying and support by the Defense
Department, however, AT&T managed to avoid the separation. Instead, the Consent Decree of
1956 restricted Western Electric to telephone manufacturing and forced it to open its patents,
including transistors, to third-party licensing. This time, AT&T successfully maintained its
monopoly status (Brock, 1994, pp.70-72).
Challenges by MCI
Although full liberalization was not intended, partial or specialized entry to the
telecommunications industry--motivated by technological progress-had been a part of FCC
policy. In 1959, the FCC permitted private use of microwaves with its Above 890 Decision
(Brock, 1994, p.107). Satellite communications were also opened by the FCC's open-sky
policy in 1974. The policy opened domestic satellite communications to companies other then
AT&T (Noam, 1995, p.36).
In 1969, Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI), obtained approval from the FCC to
construct a microwave line between St. Louis and Chicago. Since then, expansion of MCI has
continued (Brock, 1994, p. 114). In 1975, MCI began to offer a dial-up long-distance service
called Execunet by using its long-distance microwave lines and AT&T's local networks.
Because the service was not compatible with the FCC' s initial authorization for MCI as a
special common carrier, the FCC ordered MCI to discontinue Execunet (Noam, 1995, p.36).
However, in 1977, Judge J. Skelly Wright of the Appeals Court reversed the FCC's decision.
The FCC's appeal to the Supreme Court was refused. Finally, in 1978, the FCC came to a
decision regarding Execunet and authorized MCI' s service (Brock, 1994, p. 139).
AT&T Divestiture
Another antitrust case concerning AT&T had been filed in 1974, charging that AT&T
used unfair trade practices, which prevented its competitors from interconnection, by imposing
high connection fees (Brock, 1994, p.152). The Department of Justice viewed AT&T as
participating in three separate markets: as a long-distance service, local service and customer
premises equipment fee service (Brock, 1994, p.153). By restricting connection of long-
distance lines or equipment to its local networks, AT&T was deemed to be abusing its
monopoly power allowed in local service by state regulation (Noam, 1995, p.36).
In 1982, the Justice Department and AT&T reached an agreement. The Consent Decree of
1956 was modified by Judge Harold Green, known as the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ). As
a result, in 1984, AT&T was split into the new AT&T as a long-distance operator, and
twenty-two regional Bell operating companies, or Baby Bells grouped into seven Regional
Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs). Western Electric and Bell Laboratory were allowed to
remain within AT&T (Brock, 1994, pp. 161-162).
During this period, deregulation for customer premises equipment (CPE) had been
completed, advancing from the early Hush-a-Phone decision in 1956 and Carterfone decision
in 1968. After January 1, 1983, subscribers were able to install any equipment on the
telephone line they desired, as long as the equipment conformed to certain technical standards
(Brock, 1994, p.97).
Telecommunications Act of 1996
Although the regulatory framework of telecommunications was altered drastically by the
MFJ, the basic law governing the telecommunication sector was still a dated one, the
Communication Act of 1934. However, in February 1996, a new act introduced major changes
to the legal framework. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 overrules restriction imposed by
the state regarding new entry or competition in both local and long-distance telephone services
(Section 253(a))2 . The Baby Bells are allowed to engage in long-distance business outside
their regions (Section 271(b)(2)). Within their regions, long-distance service will be allowed
2 Responding to the new Act, merger of two regional Bell operating companies, Nynex and Bell Atlantic was
announced in April 1996. The merger will create the second-largest telephone company in the United States
after AT&T (The New York Times, 1996).
(Section 271(b)(1)), after completing a series of steps to remove entry barriers for local
telephone competition, known as competitive checklist (Section 271(c)(2)(B)).
The prohibition of cross-ownership of telephone and cable television services has been
abolished: a local exchange carrier can distribute video programming to the subscribers either
by open-video system (Section 653) or becoming cable television operator (Section 651). In
addition, new universal service rules are defined to continue subsidizing telephone service for
rural and low-income subscribers, and to require discounts for schools, libraries and other
public institutions upon request (Section 254). As for telephone equipment, the Act allows the
Baby Bells to manufacture telephone equipment after the FCC approves their application for
out-of-region long-distance services (Section 273).
The Act intends to accelerate development of competitive markets within all fields of the
telecommunications industry. Removing entry barriers will attract many entrepreneurs to the
industry, and thus will lead to job creation. Among others, however, the consumers will
benefit most from the Act: they will be able to choose from a variety of local telephone
operators, just like we now choose long-distance companies.
Through this competition, it is expected that the cost of local telephone services will also
be lowered, similar to what has been occurring for long-distance services. Low price is also
assured by one of the universal service principles stipulating that quality services should be
available at a just, reasonable, and affordable rate (Section 254(b)(1)). Another principle also
assures that the consumer in rural or high-cost areas will have access to telecommunications
services at rates that are reasonable when compared to those same services provided in urban
areas and that are available at rates that are reasonable when compared to rates charged for
similar services in urban areas (Section 254(b)(2)). Children will also have advantages: schools
will have access to advanced telecommunications services with discount rates (Section
254(b)(6); Section 254(h)(1)(B)). This will promote the connection of every school by
computer networks. In sum, the act is expected to make telecommunications services more
accessible, beneficial and affordable for consumers.
3.2 The United Kingdom
As in France, telephony in the United Kingdom had been owned and operated by the
private sector since the beginning. In 1911, the British Post Office acquired private telephone
companies to protect revenue from their telegraph, which had been profitable before
(Stehmann, 1995, p.238). Although the government run telephone business was not terrible in
terms of service, internal inefficiency had been criticized (Duch, 1991, p.217). With Mrs.
Thatcher's enthusiasm for the market economy, in 1981, British Telecom (BT) was created as
a separate telecommunications enterprise and separated from the Post Office. Later, in 1984,
BT was privatized. At the same time, a so-called duopoly policy, which only allowed Mercury
to enter the industry, was introduced to foster a competitive environment. As it turned out, the
duopoly policy was not successful and thus was removed in 1991 (Stehmann, 1995, p.255).
Early Development by the Private Sector
In the United Kingdom, the telephone service was established and carried out by the
private sector. For the government, the telephone was not very attractive in those days, because
it was considered to be limited to local communications. The telegraph, however, was deemed
important because of the capability of long-distance communications and profitability as well.
A couple of private companies had begun local telephone service with their own facilities.
Soon it was proven, however, that the duplication of the networks was inefficient. For
example, the Telephone Company and the Edison Telephone Company were merged to create
the United Telephone Company. This way, the local companies expanded and created inter-
city telephone lines in spite of tight regulation by a government that feared losing telegraph
revenues (Duch, 1991, pp.2 19-220).
Nationalization
The government began to consider nationalization of the telephone industry, mainly
because of the diminishing telegraph revenue because of the growing competition with the
telephone. By providing all the telecommunications services including telegraph and telephone
as well as mail, the government Post Office could capture all the revenue from both businesses.
Private telephone companies were consolidated into one company, called the National
Telephone Company, to raise their value when the government purchased the company. By the
end of the year 1911, thirty years of private provision of the telephone had ended. The Post
Office became the sole entity responsible for all telephone services.
Nationalization, however, was not a good fuel for the development of the telephone. The
reason for nationalization was, as in France, in order to protect the telegraph, not to promote
telephones as mentioned (Duch, 1991, pp.220-221).
Interwar Period
As customers were not satisfied with the deficient telephone services, the number of
criticisms against the Post Office was growing. In 1920, a select committee consisting of
business users of telephones was established to make recommendation for telephone services.
The conclusion of the Committee was that the Post Office was restricting the development of
telephony especially in the rural areas, and that the intervention of the Treasury prevented the
Post Office from making long-term plans (Duch, 1991, p.222).
The Liberal Party's election platform in 1929 emphasized the importance of increasing
investment in telephony, influenced by the Keynesian policies. The platform suggested that
telephone services should be run on businesslike principles (Duch, 1991, p.222).
In 1932, supported by industrial interests, Members of Parliament signed Memorial (a
sort of petition). It recommended the elimination of Treasury intervention to the Post Office and
the adoption of business oriented principles by the telephone service. Reacting to the Memorial,
the government made recommendations stating that the Treasury should reduce strict Treasury
auditing over expenditure, and that the autonomy of the telephone sections within the Post
Office should be expanded (Duch, 1991, p.223).
In spite of these pressures, changes were refused by both the Treasury and the Post
Office. The Treasury wanted to keep its power to control as many other government agencies
as possible. Similarly, officials in the postal service did not want to lose their positions, which
was stronger than those in the telephone service. Within the government body, the telephone
officials were their only proponents. Other recommendations by the Institute of Professional
Civil Servants that the telephone and telegraph be separated from the Post Office were also
ignored (Duch, 1991, p.224).
After the War
The year World War II ended, the Labour Party government made it a policy to create
public corporations, which had a flexible management and more freedom from auditing by the
Parliament and Treasury. However, the Post Office was not included in the list of public
corporations, due to strong opposition from workers within the Post Office. They insisted that
it is not appropriate to separate such a central department with a long history like the Post
Office from the government body. It was also argued that the telecommunications business
should be run by the government itself for national security reasons (Duch, 1991, pp.225-
226).
Although the pressure for telephone service improvement continued, recommendations
included in a number of the White Papers and other reports were not effectively implemented
(Duch, 1991, pp.227-228). However, telephone networks were becoming successful,
compared with the telephone networks in neighboring countries. Rather, internal inefficiency
was the critical problem. As shown in Table 3.1, shortly before telecommunications reform
begun, the productivity of telecommunications sectors in the UK was considerably behind that
of other industrialized countries with similar levels of telecommunications development.
Table 3.1 Performance of Telecommunications Enterprises in Selected Countries in 1980
Country Main Lines per 100 Main Lines per Income per
Inhabitants Employee Employee '
UK 31.70 73.79 28,922
France 29.33 97.90 51,114
Germany 33.39 105.31 61,137
Japan 33.13 115.26 41,444
USA 41.20 98.56 58,154
Source: ITU (1984).
'In 1980 US dollar.
Drastic Changes
For a long period, there had been little change in the regulatory framework of
telecommunications. However, drastic change began when Margaret Thatcher became the
Prime Minister in 1979. She brought a strong belief in liberalization and privatization of
industries to her new post. In 1981, the British Telecommunications Act was enacted. It
created a public corporation, British Telecom, as a separated entity from the Post Office. With a
certain degree of autonomy, BT was expected to change and become more market-oriented and
customer-oriented. However, BT's right to borrow in the private market was denied, tariffs
continued to be manipulated for political purposes, and purchasing remained under government
supervision (Duch, 1991, pp.2 3 1-232).
Apart from the creation of BT, the act liberalized telecommunications equipment
provision, which had been formerly monopolized by the Post Office. Anyone was then able to
supply customer premises equipment--all but the first telephone.3 Value added network (VAN)
services over BT' s networks were also liberalized. In addition, a competitor to BT was allowed
to enter the industry. Mercury Communications was established in 1982 as a subsidiary of
Cable and Wireless to offer nationwide fixed-link telecommunications networks (Vickers &
Yarrow, 1988, pp.204-205).
In addition to liberalization in 1981, further change was carried out and took form in the
1984 Telecommunications Act. Privatization of BT was carried out by the act, although it was
not clearly intended at the time when BT was created. Initially in 1984, 51% of BT's share was
sold to the private sector. By mid-1993 all of the shares were sold. Major expectations for
privatization were to increase internal efficiency and give financial freedom to BT (Duch, 1991,
p.233).
The act also reorganized regulators. While ultimate responsibility for telecommunication
is attributed to the Secretary of State for the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), a
nonministerial regulatory body called the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) was created.
Supervision of telecommunication policy implementation, overseeing competition and licensing
are responsibilities of the OFTEL. The Director General of Telecommunications, head of the
OFTEL, is appointed by the Secretary of State for the DTI (Stehmann, 1995, p.240).
Known as duopoly policy, BT and Mercury were assured in 1983 that there would be no
more competitors in a nationwide fixed network for seven years. The policy was intended to
encourage the healthy growth of the new entrant, Mercury. While BT was tightly regulated
with, for example, universal service obligations, Mercury was allowed more freedom. This
policy, however, led both players to pursue peaceful coexistence rather than competition. In
1994, BT still dominated with a market share of 89%, although Mercury was able to serve
75% of the UK population by 1991 (Stehmann, 1995, p.246).
A White Paper published in 1991 declared that duopoly would be abolished (Armstrong,
Cowan, & Vickers, 1994, pp.230-232). By 1994, about fifteen new entrants mainly from the
cable TV industry, which have their own network infrastructure, had been issued licenses to
operate telephony, aiming at stimulating competition (Stehmann, 1995, p. 255).
3 Later in 1985, BT's monopoly for the first telephone set was dissolved (Stehmann, 1995, p.242).
3.3 Japan
Japan's telecommunications networks had been developed by public monopoly: before
World War II, by the government itself; afterward, by a public corporation called the Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTTPC). Although the government was
strongly involved in the planning process, its intervention was, mostly, looking toward the
promotion of telecommunications, unlike the French case before the mid-1970s, as shown
later. Accordingly, telecommunications networks in Japan have been successfully developed.
In the late 1970s, two major objectives, completing nationwide full automatic dialing and
clearing waiting lists, were achieved. Aiming at further progress, liberalization of entry to
certain service areas and partial privatization of the NTTPC was carried out in 1985. Since
then, many entrepreneurs entered several areas of the telecommunications industry. Breaking-
up the NTT into a long-distance and several local companies has been discussed for over a
decade, aiming at competition in local services.
Early Development
In Japan, development of the telephone networks has been carried out by the government
from the beginning. Although there were many petitions from private companies asking for
entry to the business, the government rejected them all, due mainly to the concern regarding
national security. The government believed that important communications for military, police
and other government agencies should be done by itself. Universal service was another
concern: private companies would not serve unprofitable areas like rural or remote islands. The
Ministry of Communications (MOC) was given the exclusive right to construct and operate any
means of telecommunications in 1890. Independent telephone networks, which were
established by other government agencies including police and military (for their own use),
were transferred to the hand of the MOC and interconnected with each other (Ito & Iwata,
1994, p.441).
The development of the network was not very satisfactory in the early period. Due to the
Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95, the MOT had not received sufficient funding for the
development of the telephone network and hence could not establish a sufficient number of
telephone lines. In 1896, the number of lines waiting to be connected numbered 6,500, which
was more than double the subscribers at the time, 3,200 (Ito & Iwata, 1994, p.442).
To match the demand with the supply, the MOC introduced a system similar to an
auction: those who were willing to pay more could be served earlier. Although it helped the
development of the networks, the MOC still suffered from an increasing backlog. But the
operation of the telephone service was profitable. The revenue from operating the telephones
became a substantial revenue source, which was used to subsidize declining telegraph service
operated by the MOC as well as agencies within other ministries (Ito & Iwata, 1994, p.442).
Even during World War II, the number of telephone lines increased to 1,080,000 by the
year 1943 (Ito & Iwata, 1994, p.442). The same year, the MOC merged with the Ministry of
Transportation to establish the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC).
During war time, it was considered better to concentrate power within a few government
agencies. Shortly after the war, however, the MOTC was separated into two again and was as
before. In addition, in 1949, the MOC was divided into the Ministry of Telecommunications
and the Ministry of Postal Service.
Recovery from the War
Due to the severe destruction by World War II, the number of telephones dropped to
470,000 (Ito & Iwata, 1994, p.442). An urgent task for the government was the reconstruction
of the nation. The Advisory Council for the Reconstruction of Telegraph and Telephone, which
was created to make a recommendation to the government, made a report in 1950. It
recommended that the most efficient way to redevelop telecommunications was through the
creation of a new telecommunications entity separated from the government in order to give
autonomy and flexibility in both management and budget. Separation of domestic and
international telecommunications, which was not included in the report, had been discussed
within the government. (Ito & Iwata, 1994, p.443).
In 1952, a public corporation called the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public
Corporation was established as a monopolist, responsible for domestic telecommunications.
Another monopolistic public corporation called the Kokusai Denshin Denwa (KDD) was
created to provide international telecommunications services. At the same time, by combining
the Ministry of Telecommunications and Ministry of Postal Service, the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications (MPT) was established (Ito & Iwata, 1994, p.443).
Nevertheless, these corporations were totally owned by the government. Based on the
special acts, both corporations were also separate entities from the government. Shortly after
KDD started its operation in 1953, its status was changed to a private company by selling its
stock to the private sector. Most of the personnel and facility formerly belonging to MOC and
related to both domestic and international telecommunications were transferred to the pertinent
sections of either NTTPC or KDD. The regulatory body for the telecommunications and postal
services was left in the hands of the MPT (Ito & Iwata, 1994, p.443).
Recovery from the war was the most urgent task for the NTTPC. Two clear objectives
were to work off the long waiting list for telephone lines and to create the nationwide automatic
dialing system. To gather sufficient capital for achieving these goals, NTTPC was allowed to
charge high calling rates and expensive one-time installation charges. Moreover, subscribers
had to buy telephone bonds. For years, one quarter of the funds came from bonds (Ito &
Iwata, 1994, p.443). Compared with other public corporations like Japan National Railway,
producing huge amounts of deficit year by year, NTTPC's overall performance was
successful.4 The two objectives, clearing the waiting line and automating the dialing system,
were achieved in 1977 and 1978 respectively. Telecommunications infrastructures in Japan had
attained more than just a recovery level.
Still, the NTTPC clearly had lots of internal problems such as managerial slack and over-
enhancement. In addition, suffering from persistent government budget deficits, possibilities of
privatizing the public corporations including NTTPC had been discussed (Takano, 1992,
pp.3- 5).
Privatization and Liberalization
In April 1985, two laws were enacted: the Telecommunications Business Law and the
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Law. By the latter, Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone (NTT) was to be established as a private company, thus transforming the NTTPC.
The former law liberalized entry to any of the telecommunications businesses.
The law does not stipulate any monopolistic status for NTT. Therefore, legally speaking,
anyone can engage in any kind of telecommunications business, although the MPT has the
discretion to select new entrants in the light of the balance of the demand and supply, and other
criteria. (Telecommunications Business Law, Article 10.) Several entrepreneurs began
business in services such as long-distance, international, satellite and VAN. Three long-
distance telephone, two international telephone and two satellite communications companies
have entered the business.
Though privatized, the law stipulates that the Japanese Government should always have
one-third or more of the total shares of the NTT (NTT Law, Article 4). s Before the first
placement in October 1996, all of NTT' s shares had been owned by the Finance Minister. After
three placements, the government still holds 65.57% of NTT' s shares.6 Revenue from stock
placements, totaling $102 billion, has been used to redeem government bonds.
4 The accumulated debt became 25.1 trillion yen, or US$251 billion, when JNR was privatized and broken-up in
1987 (Fukui, 1992, p.20). Throughout this section, all price in US$ is converted from yen value in original
data, assuming US$1= 100 yen.
5 Removal of government's obligation of share-holding for long-distance entity of divested NTT was discussed
(Telecommunications Council, 1996).
6 So far, stocks were sold only three times. Of total 15,600,000, in FY 1986, 1,950,000 stocks were sold for
US$23.8 billion. In FY 1987, 1,950,000 for US$49.8 billion, and in FY 1988, 1,500,000 for US$28.5
billion (data compiled from Takano, 1992, p.29). Finance Minister plans to sell additional 500,000 stocks in
near future (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 1996b).
By having competition, both long-distance and international call rates have been
dramatically decreased. For instance, a three minute daytime long-distance call by NTT
between Tokyo and Osaka, some 300 miles away, which cost $4 just after the privatization in
1985, sank to $1.80 in 1993 (MPT, 1995, p. 180). Similarly, the cost for a three minute KDD
international call from Japan to the United States has decreased from $15.30 in 1985 to $4.80
in 1995 (MPT, 1995, p.180). In contrast, the local service still monopolized by NTT is still
relatively expensive: for instance, a three minute inter-city call has been raised from 10 cents in
1985 to 30 cents in 1994 (Telecommunications Council, 1996).
Debates regarding the breakup of NTT have been continuing since the privatization of the
NTT was first discussed in 1982. However, the plan has been prolonged repeatedly. The most
recent debate ended in March 1996, and resulted in further postponement for a year. Protest for
change comes from politicians backed by NTT's workers' union and from the electronic
equipment industry afraid to lose international competitiveness by the world largest
telecommunications company (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 1996a).
3.4 France
In France, telephony was initiated by the private sector due to a lack of government funds
as well as enthusiasm. As a result, development of the networks was only slowly progressing,
after and before the nationalization of the sector. Until the early 1970s, little attention had been
paid to telecommunications. However, after politicians recognized its importance for economic
growth, intensive investment and also sector reforms have been made. Now, France enjoys
one of the most advanced telecommunications infrastructures in the world. France's
telecommunications history suggests to us both the advantages and disadvantages of a strong
government intervention in the telecommunications industry.
Private Development
When the telephone was first introduced to France at the World Fair in Paris in 1878, the
government was not very interested in it (Stehmann, 1995, p. 178). Mainly because of financial
problems as a result of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), the government was very
reluctant to develop telephony. Any government expenditure other than for national defense
was highly restricted. Therefore, development of the infrastructure including electricity and
water supply as well as telephone had to be carried out by the private sector. In addition, the
government was not enthusiastic about telephony itself, because telegraphy was a profitable
business for the government in those days. Telegraphy had to be protected by putting lesser
priority on telephony (Duch, 1991, pp. 167-168).
Thus, telephone services in France began with the help of the private sector. Several local
companies obtained five-year concessions to provide service from local authorities in 1879.
Years later, all the local concessionaires were merged into one private company called Soci6t6
des G6n6rale des T616phones (SGT). As the period of some concessions was very short, the
concessionaires did not have strong incentive to invest in networks. The possibility of
nationalization was also the reason for lack of enthusiasm for telephony. Unlike local telephone
service, long-distance service was regarded as a menace for telegraphy. The French
government decided to undertake the service by itself, thus minimizing the risk of losing
telegraphy revenue. Promoting telephony was not the first agenda of the government policy
(Duch, 1991, pp. 168-169).
Nationalization
As the threat to telegraphy increased with the development of local networks, the SGT
was finally nationalized and transferred to the French Post and Telegraph Administration in
1889. This decision gave little or no consideration to economic or technology issues. The
reason for nationalization was in fact only to protect the revenue from the government-run
telegraph service, which was still profitable. The French government was afraid that
competition between telegraph and telephone would injure the telegraph (Duch, 1991, pp. 169-
170).
In spite of nationalization, the French government could not raise the funds needed for
telephone development. The policy, that local authorities were responsible for establishing the
local network, was adopted. The revenues from the telephone service, however, would go to
the central government. Therefore, there was little incentive to invest in the telephone networks
for local authorities. On the whole, the telephone network developed very slowly even after the
nationalization, because of the reluctance of the government to commit itself to the cause of
telephony (Duch, 1991, p.170).
Slow Development
In the 1920s, much criticism was voiced regarding the inability of the French government
to develop telephone networks. Although privatization had been discussed several times, it had
never been realized. A separate budget for telephony was adopted in 1923; however, it was not
effective because of the depression. France still had to accept its position as a country with a
poor telephone infrastructure (Duch, 1991, p.172). During World War II, a major change
regarding the telecommunications policy was the creation of the Direction G6n6rale de
T616communications (DGT), which was separated from the Direction Gdn6rale de Post et
T616communications (Duch, 1991, p. 175).
After the war, the government initiated an intensive plan to help the French economy
recover from the devastating caused by the war. Several industries were selected to receive
funds; however, telecommunications was excluded. The first time this sector was included was
in 1966; however, the allocated budget for telecommunications was a small amount (Duch,
1991, pp.173-174). Therefore, until the mid-1970s, France suffered seriously from an
underdeveloped telephone network. In 1975, the number of main lines per 100 inhabitants was
only 13.44, a figure far below the level of the Western Europe average, 17.50, as shown in
Table 3.2. Quality was poor too: on average, it took three calls to get connected properly when
making a long-distance call (Stehmann, 1995, p. 178).
Table 3.2 Telephone Main Lines per 100 Inhabitants in Selected EC Nations in 1975
Country France Germany UK Spain Italy Average
Line density 13.44 20.76 22.90 13.17 17.24 17.50
Source: 1TU (1984).
Rapid Growth
As France' s underdeveloped telecommunications system appeared to be in a very serious
state, the issue begun to attract the attention of politicians. As for financing, since the
importance of telecommunications was first recognized in the government economic plan in
1966, investment in the telecommunications sector increased markedly (Duch, 1991, p.173)
(Figure 3.1). During the Giscard d'Estaing administration, a telecommunications promotion
policy called T616matique was introduced in 1978 (Duch, 1991, p.165). Strong government
intervention remained, however, even though the policy had been changed drastically towards
promoting the development of telecommunications, instead of just being an impediment. By
1994, France came to have one of the most advanced telecommunications networks in the
world (Table 3.3).
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Figure 3.1 Investment in Telecommunications and Line Density in France in 1970s
Source: ITU (1975; 1984).
Table 3.3 Rate of Digitized Lines in Selected Countries in 1993-94
Country France Japan USA UK
Digitized Rate 85% ' 83% ' 65% 2 64% 2
Source: MPT (1995).
1 In 1994. 2 In 1993.
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Reform
During the Chirac administration (1986-88), separation of the telecommunications and
postal business entity from the Minist6re des Postes, and des TU6lcommunications et de
T616diffusion had been discussed. Based on this idea, two laws were adopted in 1990. One
was to reorganize the institution as a whole, and the other was to introduce regulatory reform
(Stehmann, 1995, pp. 179-180).
France Tl66com (FT) and La Poste were transformed into public corporations and
separated entities from the Minist6re. Broader autonomy was given to FT. The management of
FT is responsible to its board of directors, president and a chief executive officer. FT' s budget
is no longer required to be approved by the government. In addition, separate regulatory
regimes were adopted for each aspect of the infrastructure, services and terminals for
telecommunications. While FT's monopolistic status was confirmed in the field of basic
telephone infrastructure and service, other markets including mobile and satellite
communications, value added service, independent networks ante terminals were liberalized
(Stehmann, 1995, pp. 179-180).
Privatization of FT has been discussed. In 1993, the French Cabinet decided to transform
FT to a joint stock company in the near future. However, strong opposition from labor unions
makes privatization difficult (MPT, 1995, p.343).
3.5 Germany
German telecommunications is characterized by a government monopoly from the
beginning. Until World War I, the development of networks had been steadily progressing.
However, due to losing financial autonomy from the growing political pressure, the growth of
telecommunications had been decelerated instead of accelerated. After recovery from the
devastation of World War II, German telecommunications became revitalized. In recent years,
however, disadvantages of government monopoly have been brought to light. The German
telecommunications entity, DBP Telekom, has been separated from the government body and
competition was introduced into parts of the telecommunications services. Privatization of DBP
Telekom is now under consideration.
Early Development
Unlike the United Kingdom and France, telephony in Germany has been developed by
the government from the outset-with the German Constitution of 1871 as a basis (Duch,
1991, p.125). In 1880, the responsibility of the Reichspost, the German mail and telegraph
authority, was extended to include telephony. Although private companies tried to enter the
telephone service market, the government rejected all the applications and thereby assured the
exclusive right of the Reichspost for telephones and telegraph. In 1892, the Telegraphengesetz
was established (Stehmann, 1995, p.187). Later, in 1928, the monopoly status of the
Reichspost was also authorized by the Telecommunications Installation Act
(Femmeldeanlagengesetz or FAG) (Stehmann, 1995, p. 188).
Steady investment in networks was carried out. As a result, development of telephony
had progressed rapidly by the early 1900s. In fact, in 1887, the number of telephones in
Germany was greater than in any other European country (Duch, 1991, p. 126).
Government ownership of the telephone service seemed to be functioning well in
Germany. However, as politicians came to be aware of the importance of telephones, political
pressure gradually increased. Due to political instability, investment in the telephone became
unreliable. As a result, rapid development of telephones could no longer be expected (Duch,
1991, p. 127).
Decline
After World War I, the cost of telephone development dramatically increased, because of
network extensions to smaller communities and the replacement of manual exchanges with
automatic ones. In addition, hyper-inflation decreased telephone revenues. To keep a profit
and still cover all the increased expenditures caused by inflation, tariffs should have been
raised. However, to make any change in tariffs was time consuming due to required legislative
approval. Shortage of capital had seriously injured the Reichspost (Duch, 1991, pp. 129- 13 1).
It was widely recognized that some measure had to be taken to improve the situation.
Reform of the telephone sector was discussed to extend a certain amount of autonomy to some
financing and regulatory aspects. The Imperial Postal Finances Act (Reichspostfinanzgesetz),
was enacted in 1924 to assure the Reichspost of financial and managerial independence.
However, there were few opportunities to take advantage of this change. After the Nazis took
over power in 1933, independence of government organizations was lost again (Duch, 1991,
pp.129-131). With the devastation of World War II, the German telephone situation became
worse.
Creation of the Deutsche Bundespost
The most urgent task for the government after the war was, of course, recovering from
the devastation. Although almost all institutional structures were destroyed too, a regulatory
framework for postal affairs and telecommunications was soon restored by adopting the old
FAG created in 1928 (Stehmann, 1995, p.188).
After the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Deutsche Bundespost (DBP)
was created in 1950 as a government agency, responsible for postal service, postal banking
and telecommunications (Duch, 1991, p.138). As shown in Table 3.4, the German telephony
situation had improved rapidly. Within ten years after losing the war, Germany got ahead of
France in terms of the number of telephone sets. By 1980, Germany reached a level similar to
the one of the United Kingdom.
Table 3.4 Telephone Sets per 100 Inhabitants in Germany, France and UK in 1950-80
Country Germany France UK
1950 4.4 6.6 10.2
1955 13.2 11.1 17.4
1965 14.9 12.5 18.4
1970 22.5 17.2 25.1
1980 46.4 45.9 47.7
Source: Duch (1991, 133) and 1TU (1972; 1984).
Although it appeared that the DBP had been functioning well, the DBP also clearly had
problems: less incentive to improve internal efficiency due to its public ownership, and
payment of 10% of its profit to the federal budget in exchange for tax exemption. However, the
DBP usually had to pay more than just the amount of the tax-cross subsidies from long-
distance to local services, from less profitable areas to more profitable areas, from telephone to
postal service; and enjoyed the dual function of DBP' s ministers as regulators and the status of
a business entity (Stehmann, 1995, p. 189).
Reforming the Sector
In 1987, the Witte Commission issued a report recommending reformation of the
telecommunications sector. It emphasized the introduction of competition into the sector.
However, the possibility of privatization was not discussed due mainly to the question of
constitutionality. Moreover, basic telephony was not considered an object for competition to
avoid duplicate investments (Duch, 1991, p. 156).
In 1989, a law concerning the restructuring of the postal and telecommunications sector
and of the Deutsche Bundespost (Postsstrukturgesetz) was enacted. The law separated the DBP
into a regulator, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and three business entities, DBP
Telekom (telecommunications), DBP Postdienst (postal) and DBP Postbank (banking). At the
same time, the FAG was amended to introduce partial competition to the telecommunication
sectors. However, a federal monopoly over network infrastructures as well as basic telephone
services was retained. Although privatization had been discussed, a modification of Germany's
constitution is necessary, which requires a two-thirds majority of Parliament. Thus, DBP
Telekom is totally owned by the federal government (Wellenius & Stern, 1994, p. 6 14).
Intentions of separating DBP Telekom from DBP were voiced in order to avoid abuse of
its special status as a government agency when operating in the liberalized market. In addition,
separate regulators were necessary to oversee price and quantity of telecommunications
services, especially when introducing partial competition. In the absence of pertinent
regulation, cross-subsidizing from a monopolistic service to a competitive service would occur
easily, resulting in reduced quality and higher charge in the monopolistic service (Stehmann,
1995, p.205).
However, the 1989 reform turned out to be not sufficient to give autonomy to DBP
Telekom to pursue these goals. The government continued to use DBP Telekom as a political
device. Because of political control, heavy financial burdens were imposed on DBP Telekom:
the cost for developing networks in the former East Germany, subsidies for the DBP
Postdienst and DBP Postbank and payment of 10% of turnover to the federal budget.
Additional reforms were taking place in 1992 to reduce these shortcomings, aiming at
privatization of DBP Telekom. However, it will only be possible after the amendment of the
German constitution (Stehmann, 1995, pp.206-207).
3.6 Italy
Telephone service in Italy is best characterized by fragmentation. Local networks were
started and served by the private sector, whereas long-distance service was provided by the
government. Although the local operators were nationalized later, different regulators are
responsible for local and long-distance service. Moreover, international service, telex and
telegraph are served by different operators. As a result of this fragmentation, Italian
telecommunications could not be developed efficiently. As opposed to the reforms other
countries undertook at an earlier time in history, integration of the Italian operators was only
recently initiated and finally realized in 1994.
Fragmentation
Initially, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) of Italy tried to establish
telephone networks by itself. However, due to lack of sufficient funds, the MPT in the 1920s
entrusted the task to private hands, both domestic and foreign, by offering concessions. A few
private companies created and offered services in local areas. But the Ministry offered services
for long-distance and local in the areas where no concessionaire could be found.
During the 1930s, the Institute per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) consolidated all of
the private telephone companies. Since then, no fundamental reform has happened up to this to
date in the telecommunications regulatory framework except for a short period of
nationalization for national security reason during World War II (Stehmann, 1995, p.209).
The telecommunications sector has been governed by two government bodies, the MPT
and the IRI. Under the IRI, there is a state owned institute called Societi Finanziaria Telefonica
(STET), which controls four separate private companies: Societd Italiana per 1'Esercizio
Telefonico (SIP), responsible for local networks; Italcable for international telephone, telex and
telegraph outside the EU; Italtel for manufactures of telecommunications equipment; and
Telespazio for satellite communications (Stehmann, 1995, p.2 10).
The MPT also controls three separate organizations: Azienda di Stato per i Servizi
Telefonici (ASST), which is responsible for domestic long-distance and intra EU international
services; Direzione Centrale Servizi Telegrafici (DCST) for domestic telex and telegraph
services; and Direzione Centrale Servizi Radioelettrici (DCSR) for maritime radio-telephone
services (Stehmann, 1995, p.210).
Reorganization
Because of a complicated institutional structure, the Italian system has been inefficient.
For example, a long-distance call from Rome to Milan requires the use of the Rome SIP local
network, ASST long-distance network and Milan SIP local network. This kind of
interconnection might not cause any problems, if connections among networks would be well
coordinated. However, because ASST and SIP are supervised by different government
agencies, the MPT and the IRI respectively, long-distance calls are often cumbersome
(Stehmann, 1995, p.211).
As shown in Figure 3.2, the growth of networks seemed to be not very slow until the
mid-1970s, compared with neighboring countries. However, after the French government
began intensive investment in telecommunications, the negligence in progress became obvious.
Recognizing the poor condition of telecommunications in Italy, reform had been
discussed aiming mainly to eliminate, if possible, inefficiencies due to organizational
fragmentation in both operator and regulator entities. In 1992, the Italian parliament ratified the
transfer of ASST to IRI, after approval by the Senate. However, because the transfer of the
operator involves the transfer of power from the MPT to the IRI, political obstacles made it
difficult to realize the plan (Stehmann, 1995, p.212). Finally in August 1994, all of the
telecommunications operators were replaced by newly created company called Telecom Italia
(Financial Times, 1994). Now, the company is the sixth largest telecommunications operator in
the world in terms of revenue as well as the number of main lines (ITU, 1995, p.A84-A85).
The reform in Italy seems successful so far: the number of lines per employee increased from
258 in 1994 to 280 in 1995; net income was increased by 20% in 1995, whereas net
borrowings were reduced by 20% (Telecom Italia, 1996).
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Figure 3.2 Growth of Telephone Main Lines in Europe in 1965-90
Source: ITU (1972; 1984; 1992).
3.7 Spain
A private monopoly with strong governmental influences is the phrase best characterizing
Spanish telecommunications sectors. Institutions appear to have not been contributing to the
development of telecommunications networks in Spain, which is far below the Western
European standard. In spite of reforms carried out during the 1980s, which included
liberalization in VAN and separation of the regulatory body from the business entities, Spain
still requires further improvement on the local information infrastructure.
Private Monopoly
During the half century from its beginning in 1877, telephone service in Spain has been
owned and operated by private companies and local authorities. In 1924, International
Telephone and Telegraph established a company called Compafiia Telef6nica Nacional de
Espafia with a license from the Spanish government. Telef6nica was granted a concession,
allowing the exclusive rights for telephone operation for 20 years. The concession has been
renewed several times and is still valid today (Stehmann, 1995, p.225).
After a short period of nationalization after World War II, a decree issued in 1946
confirmed Telef6nica' s exclusive right of basic telephone service, as well as the responsibility
for planning and development of the networks. Autonomy as a private company was given to a
certain extent; however, the budget and tariff were subject to government approval (Stehmann,
1995, p.225).
Service that Telef6nica can provide has been extended several times by state decrees. In
1970, Telef6nica obtained the right to provide radio-telephone serving coasts and ports and
data communications. Rights to provide teleinformatics, facsimile, videotext and teletex
services were granted in 1978. Although Telef6nica' s function has been expanded, the
regulatory framework has remained almost unchanged for a very long time since its
establishment (Stehmann, 1995, p.225).
Restructuring
The private monopoly status for Telef6nica had not contributed to the growth of
telecommunications networks in Spain. Obviously, Spanish telecommunications was less
developed, especially when compared with those in most other European Community member
states. Nevertheless, the number of telephone main lines is not necessarily a good measure of
network development; we will refer to it as a performance measure. Table 3.5 shows the slow
network development in Spain.
100 Inhabitants in Selected EC Nations in 1965-80
Year Spain France Germany UK Italy Average
1965 5.51 6.10 8.21 11.21 8.70 8.56
1970 8.38 8.10 13.97 15.50 12.00 12.39
1975 13.17 13.44 20.76 22.90 17.24 18.59
1980 19.32 29.33 33.39 31.70 22.77 29.30
Source: 1TU (1972; 1984).
Consequently, there was a growing concern regarding the influence of poor
telecommunications on the economy in the early 1980s. Because of discussions within the
government, telecommunications was incorporated into the national economic plan in 1984
(Stehmann, 1995, p.227). In addition, a decree was introduced in the following year to
promote improvement of telecommunications networks. The reform included establishment of
the Direcci6n General de Telecommunicaciones (DGT) and the Junta Nacional de
Telecommunicaciones (JNT) within the government. The former is responsible for regulation,
legislation, licensing and authorization of telecommunications. The latter is in charge of
planning policy and introducing new technology regarding telecommunications. Also, the
functions assigned to newly established government entities were removed from Telef6nica
(Stehmann, 1995, p.226).
In 1987, a new law called the Ley de Ordenaci6n de Telecommunications (LOT) was
established, incorporating the former decree. The law stipulates, that any radio and cable
communication are the exclusive right of the state. Therefore, any telecommunications
company will be operating on behalf of the state with a concession or license. That those bearer
services, including telecommunications infrastructures themselves, will be provided by a
monopoly is also stipulated in the law. Thus, the monopoly status of Telef6nica is legally
confirmed.
Competition was introduced only into VAN services (Stehmann, 1995, p.226). Being a
legal private company, Telef6nica has autonomy; however, government intervention is strong:
32% of its share is owned by the government (Wellenius & Stern, 1994, p.657); a delegate
who has veto power is sent to the board of directors from the government; and the government
reserves the right to renegotiate the concession agreement and to impose further obligations on
Telef6nica (Stehmann, 1995, p. 2 3 6).
Table 3.5 Telephone Main Lines per
A series of government initiatives clearly promoted the development of
telecommunications. Investment in telecommunications infrastructures had increased fivefold
during a decade in the 1980s. Telephone main lines, which counted less than 20 per 100 people
in 1980, became more than 30 in 1989 (ITU, 1992). Of all lines installed in that year, 87%
were digital (Stehmann, 1995, p.228).
In spite of significant growth during the 1980s, telecommunications in Spain was still
considered less developed by European standards as shown in Table 3.6. As we will discuss in
Chapter 4, line density is closely connected to GDP per capita of the country. However, even
allowing for the low Spanish GDP, the number of main lines was still considered insufficient
as shown in Figure 3.3.
To stimulate markets further, something has to be done; however, the monopoly of
Telef6nicain voice telephony is confirmed until the year 2003 by the Council of the Ministers
of the EU (Wellenius & Stern, 1994, p.657).
Table 3.6 Telephone Main Lines per 100 Inhabitants in All EU Member Nations in 1994
Country Line Density Country Line Density
Sweden 68.31 Greece 47.81
Denmark 60.37 Austria 46.51
Luxembourg 55.35 Belgium 44.90
Finland 55.11 Italy 42.94
France 54.74 Spain 37.13
The Netherlands 50.87 Portugal 35.03
UK 48.87 Ireland 35.00
Germany 48.31 Average 48.75
Source: ITU (1995).
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Figure 3.3 GDP per Capita vs. Line Density in EU Member Nations in 1994
Source: ITU (1995).
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3.8 Mexico
Telephony in Mexico had been developed by two private companies with foreign capital
from the United States and Sweden, although both companies were initiated by Mexican
entrepreneurs. Later, two companies were merged to form the TELMEX, which had been a
private company until 1972 except for a short period during the Mexican revolution. Although
it had been growing steadily, after nationalization, the TELMEX was severely affected by a
foreign debt crisis during the 1980s and therefore its performance declined. In 1990, TELMEX
was re-privatized as part of President Salinas' s economic reform plan.
Early Development by Foreign Capital
Mexico's telephone service was begun by a local entrepreneur in 1878. Federal licenses
were issued to permit private companies to establish local telephone networks. Later, a license
was given to a Mexican national called A. G. Greenwood to establish long-distance networks
that interconnect established local networks. However, lacking finance and technology as well,
Greenwood soon sold the concession of his company to an American-owned company, the
Continental Telephone Company (CTC), which was later renamed to Mextelco. Although,
Mextelco did not have exclusive rights to provide telephone service in Mexico, supported by
American capital and technology, it acquired most of its competitors (Petrazzini, 1995, p. 106).
However, as the Mexican government's interest in telecommunications stimulated
competition, a new license was issued to a Mexican entrepreneur for establishing local lines
within Mexico City. The consequence was similar to the case of Greenwood. Two years later,
the license was sold to a Swedish company, L.M. Ericsson & Co. The company was renamed
to Mexeric in 1907. During the Mexican revolution in the 1910s, Mextelco was nationalized
while Mexeric was allowed to remain in private status. Later in 1925, Mextelco was returned to
private hands, the International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT). Until the mid-1940s, duopoly
by Mextelco and Mexeric continued their competition with each other, although both were not
well interconnected (Petrazzini, 1995, p. 107).
Integration and Nationalization
After World War II, Mexeric was dissolved in 1947 to form a new company, Telefonos
de Mexico, S.A., known as TELMEX. The majority of this private company was owned by
Mexicans, a small part by Swedish investors. Although it was a private company, the Mexican
government dispatched two high officials to the executive board of TELMEX. Since then, the
tradition of weak government intervention into the telecommunications industry in Mexico has
been changed to strong one. Three years later, almost all of the telecommunications structures
came under the control of TELMEX through the acquisition of Mextelco.
One of the government policies that helped to extend the networks was the requirement
for subscribers to purchase TELMEX shares. This action contributed greatly to network
development. But it also resulted in the loss of the position of major shareholder for Ericsson.
Finally, in 1958, the government forced ITT and Ericsson to sell their shares of TELMEX to
Mexican nationals. TELMEX now became purely domestic and was still a private company
whose majority was owned by the private sector. In 1972, however, TELMEX' s 51% of
shares was acquired by the government and thus it was considered nationalized (Petrazzini,
1995, pp. 108-109).
Re-Privatization
TELMEX had as good a performance record during the decade after nationalization as
before (Figure 3.4). Network expansion to rural areas and upgrading dated networks to digital
was intensively undertaken.
However, problems became apparent in the 1980s. As TELMEX was a very profitable
enterprise, the government used it as a tool for raising revenues. The tax on local calls was
69.94% in 1980, and was raised to 90.48% in 1989 (Petrazzini, 1995, p.109). As the budget
was subject to government approval, TELMEX could not receive funds when necessary.
Consequently, TELMEX became to depend on foreign loans (Petrazzini, 1995, p. 110).
Although the performance of TELMEX dropped in the 1980s compared with the previous
decade, it was not very serious: by 1981, 99% of the exchanges became automatic; in a single
year of 1989, 22% of lines were digitized (Ramamurti, 1996, p.75). Far more terrible for
Mexico was, in fact, a huge amount of internal and foreign debts due to the decline of the
world oil market in the 1980s.
After Carlos Salinas de Gortari became the President of Mexico in 1988, programs to
restructure the economy were carried out, including privatization of TELMEX (Ramamurti,
1996, p.77). However, because it had kept a relatively good performance record, as
mentioned, privatization of TELMEX did not intend to improve its performance in the first
place. Ramamurti (1996, p. 101) wrote that the major objectives of privatization were: (1) using
the privatization of TELMEX to send a signal to local and foreign investors that Mexico was
embarking on a new economic strategy, and (2) using the sale proceeds to reduce the country' s
fiscal deficit and public indebtedness. Because it was Mexico' s largest state-owned enterprise,
privatizing TELMEX was considered a good advertisement for economic restructuring-which
was an undertaking of the Salinas administration.
In 1990, 20.4% of TELMEX' s shares were sold to both domestic and foreign private
sectors, including France Cable et Radio and Southwestern Bell International (Petrazzini,
1995, p.120). TELMEX has exclusive rights for basic service through 1996. A TELMEX
subsidiary called TELCELis providing cellular service, competing with new entrants in several
regions (Wellenius & Stern, 1994, p.635).
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Figure 3.4 Growth of Telephone Main Lines in
Source: ITU (1975; 1984; 1992).
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4 National Telecommunications Sector
Performance Analyses
Designing telecommunications policy requires performance analysis, since any reform
seeks to improve performance of telecommunications enterprises. To perform an analysis, first
the performance should be measured; however, in fact, to define performance seems difficult.
Although various kinds of indicators for telecommunications sectors are available, any
combination of such indicators is deemed to be irrelevant with regard to representing
"performance" of the sector.
However, telephone density can be a good index as a performance measurement, when
examining the density in relationship to GDP per capita in all economic classes of the world.
Nevertheless, even though such correlation certainly exists in general, it cannot be observed for
high-income economies. As the reasons for deviation can be attributed to regulatory,
organizational and/or institutional issues, ownership of the telecommunications enterprise
seems not as significant as is widely believed.
4.1 Performance Indicators
Many indicators are available for telecommunications sectors that may reflect their
performance, quantitatively or qualitatively. Quantitative indicators include the number of
telephone sets, the number of telephone main lines, the number of pay phones, telephone
traffic volume and revenue of the telephone company. Qualitative indicators include the waiting
time, the call failure rate, the line fault rate and so on (ITU 1992, ITU 1995). Examples of
available indicators are line density and fault rates.
The problem is that any single indicator cannot explain overall performance of any
telecommunications sector. Moreover, finding the best combination of the available indicators
that may reflect the performance of telecommunications in a particular country is difficult.
On the one hand, if there is frequent trouble with the network, having many phones
might be useless. On the other hand, less communication failure might mean excessive
investment in the networks and thus a high telephone charge to the consumer. Less time on the
waiting list could be explained by a lesser demand for telephones due to underdevelopment of
networks, not by efficiency of the operator. Small numbers of pay phones might imply a high
diffusion rate of telephones installed in offices and homes or the existence of mobile
telephones. Low growth rates of main lines might indicate not underdevelopment but
saturation.
In fact, an attempt by OECD to find criteria to measure telecommunications performance
seemed not to be very successful:
There is no single indicator of performance but a variety of measures
that provide an insight into the operation of the PTO' from economic, social,
managerial and consumer perspectives. The standards by which the PTO should
be judged vary according to the objectives that are set by management or the
regulators. These may relate to price, quality, user choice or efficiency.
International comparisons reveal interesting and growing disparities between
PTO performance, but there is surprisingly little correspondence between
indicators. A good performance in one service does not allow one to predict a
favorable performance in other services, and no PTO can claim to be perfect in
all respects. (OECD, 1990, p.159)
It also warns of abuse of performance statistics stating that "the selective use of
comparative statistics can be used to prove almost anything" (OECD, 1990, p. 159).
7 Public Telecommunications Operator
4.2 Telephone Density vs. GDP per Capita
A deductive approach to find appropriate indicators seems very difficult. Instead, we will
take the inductive approach. We begin with the assumption that a wealthier country has a better
telecommunications system. Every country recognizes that the telecommunications are not only
luxuries to be enjoyed by the wealthy but a necessity for further economic growth of the
nation. Wealthy countries have continued to invest in telecommunications networks as much as
they can. As a result, countries with large scale economies have well-established networks.
Therefore, by examining the wealthy countries' telecommunications situations, we can know
what the performance level could be. We also assume that the wealth of the nation is
represented by GDP per capita.
Relationship between line density and GDP per capita is shown in Figure 4.1. Fault rate
and waiting time vs. the GDP per capita is shown in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, respectively.
We can observe clear relationships between the GDP per capita and line density, while, in
contrast, fault rate and waiting time shows less of a correlation with the GDP. In fact,
relationship between the GDP per capita and the line density probably has been the most
referred to fact to explain and to persuade others of the importance of telecommunications in
economic development since Jipp pointed this out in 1963 (cited in Saunders, Warford &
Wellenius, 1994, p.86).
To a certain extent, the existence of such a relationship seems self-evident. Assuming
that the most advanced telecommunications system is the one with the highest line density, the
lowest fault rate and the least waiting time, investment would naturally be made to accomplish
these objectives--if there are sufficient funds available for telecommunications. Consequently,
the GDP per capita and the performance of the telecommunications sector would eventually be
closely connected.
With the above mentioned considerations in mind, we will choose a single indicator as a
standard to measure the performance of a telecommunications sector in a particular country.
Placing emphasis on simplicity and availability, we will use telephone main lines per 100
inhabitants, or line density, as a performance indicator.
100.0
10.0 -
1.0 -
100 1,000 10,000
GDP per Capita in US Dollar (1993)
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4.3 Performance Divergence
In the previous section, we observed that the existence of a strong relationship between
the GDP per capita and line density. However, if we take a closer look at the relationship for a
specific economic class, it is proven that there is deviation from the trend line. In the case of
high-income economic classes, we can no longer observe a strong relationship between
income and the line density, as we could see in all other economic classes.
Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between the GDP per capita and the line density only
for high income economiess , which include all the upper income countries (population totals
are less than one million). Therefore, factors other than the GDP per capita might dominate the
performance of the telecommunications enterprises. The wealth of a nation largely determines
the performance of telecommunications; however, the deviation cannot be explained only by
the economy.
As we saw in Chapter 3, in most of the industrialized countries, telecommunications
network development has been conducted by governments. Thus, differences cannot be
attributed to ownership alone; institutions, political influence and organization are other
possible sources of deviation.
As we reviewed in Chapter 3, they greatly vary from nation to nation. One of the counties
with strong governmental intervention, France, now possesses one of the most advanced
telecommunications systems available; however, until the mid-1970s, France had been known
for its underdeveloped telecommunications. Strong government initiative and intensive
investment could be an explanation for that country's rapid expansion in recent decades.
In the United States, telecommunications development has been carried out by the private
sector. It also enjoys one of the most developed telecommunications systems in the world. Not
only did the federal government not intervene in AT&T's business policies or development
plans, but regulations even protected its existing monopolistic status for a long time. Because
these environments assured AT&T' s economic and political stability, telephone networks in the
United States have been growing successfully.
Like the United States, Spanish telephony has been developed by private companies;
however, its line density still ranks close to the bottom of EC nations. While the Spanish
government strongly intervenes into Telef6nica' s plans and budgets, it has not been very
enthusiastic in developing new networks. Stehmann (1995, p.227) points out that geography is
another reason for this conservative attitude: while Spain' s population is concentrated in a few
8 According to the World Bank grouping, in this paper, countries are classified by their GNP per capita in 1993
US$, as low (smaller than $695), lower-middle (between $696 and $2,785), upper-middle (between $2,785 and
$8,625) and high (greater than $8,626).
key cities, many sparsely populated areas remain. Extending networks to such peripheral areas
would be expensive.
Although we did not include Sweden's case in our survey, it is an interesting one.
Initially, there was a short period of competition between Bell's subsidiary, Swedish
entrepreneurs, local authorities and the government, with the result that Stockholm had the
largest number of telephones in Europe in 1885 (Bohlin, 1993, p.245). Soon they were
integrated into Telegrafverkt, a typical European state-owned PTT. After reaching a line
density of 40 by the year 1967, line density in Sweden now almost extends past 70-a number
that ranks Sweden at the top worldwide.
The United Kingdom, which also had been served by a government monopoly until
1984, has had a good record of telecommunications development. In terms of line density, the
UK always kept above neighboring European countries, as we saw in Figure 3.2. The BT
privatization was done not due to performance but to diminish internal inefficiency, and
government deficits. Margaret Thatcher' s ideology toward a market oriented economy also
helped to improve the telecommunications developments. Initially, government agencies and
later public corporations had been developing Japan' s telecommunications infrastructures. Line
density is not very high, as expected from its GDP per capita. This does not necessarily mean
an underdevelopment of the telephone networks, because by mid-1970s, the waiting list for
telephone lines was completely cleared.
As shown in Figure 4.4 as well as in Figure 3.3, the relationship between GDP per capita
and line density for countries in a high income class, is weak. Because R-square is about 0.32,
it is not statistically meaningful. The result, however, can be used as a reference. Table 4.1
shows inconsistency among institutions, organization, performance and wealth.
Table 4.1 Expected Line Density for Selected High-Income Countries
Country GDP per Line Expected Deviation Telecom Government
Capita' Density2 Line Density (%) ' Ownership 5 Intervention
61.81
53.12
50.41
50.09
49.92
48.20
46.08
45.24
41.43
-28.82
11.71
7.90
26.67
-3.33
16.23
-7.31
7.43
-11.59
Public
Private
Government
Government
Government
Mixed
Government
Government
Semi-Private
Strong
Weak
Strong
Strong
Strong
Medium
Strong
Strong
Strong
Source: ITU (1995).
Notes: As it is difficult to determine the degree of government intervention, what indicated here are author's
subjective views, judging from historical review in Chapter 3 and other materials.
SIn US dollar in 1993. 2 In 1994. ' Calculated by least-square regression. 4 1 - (Expected Line Density / Line
Density). s An enterprise contributed to major development of telecommunications.
Japan
USA
France
Sweden
Germany
Canada
Italy
UK
Spain
33,757
24,580
21,719
21,376
21,198
19,384
17,141
16,251
12,229
47.98
60.17
54.74
68.31
48.31
57.54
42.94
48.87
37.13
5 Conclusion: Policy Recommendations
for Developing Countries
As we saw in Chapter 3, in most industrialized countries, telecommunications services
and other kinds of public utilities have been provided mainly by the public sector. Expansion of
public sectors continued until the 1970s. However, due mainly to decreasing economic growth
and budget deficit crises in the 1980s, most governments could no longer sustain public
sectors. As a result, the question whether or not public sectors should be retained in order to
reduce the burden on governments, was argued intensely.
The worldwide trend of telecommunications reform began in most industrialized
countries in the early 1980s. In the United States, the break up of AT&T in 1984 opened entry
to the telecommunications business. In the same year, privatization of BT took place in the
United Kingdom, following its separation from the Post Office in 1981. NTT of Japan was
transformed from a public corporation into a joint stock company in 1985. This privatization
trend also held for developing countries. With the strong support of President Carlos Salinas,
20% of TELMEX shares were sold in 1990.
It seems that nothing can stop the trend of reform, especially privatization, which is
considered a universal remedy for improving telecommunications in any country. However,
what kind of reform would actually be effective for developing countries has to be well
considered before implementation.
5.1 Modes of Reform
As discussed in Chapter 2, telecommunications inevitably needs regulations regarding,
for instance, price or universal service. In the case of natural monopolies, tighter regulation on
the monopolist or public ownership would be justified. However, regulation and local, often
bureaucratic, institutions have been blamed for the creation of inefficient telecommunications
systems and therefore reforms are considered necessary.
Deregulation, liberalization, corporatization and privatization are common measures of
reform. Deregulation and liberalization are alterations of regulatory frameworks, whereas
corporatization and privatization involve transformation of telecommunications enterprises.
Usually, these four measures are applied together. As we reviewed Japan' s case, we have seen
that it involved liberalization of the telecommunications market and privatization of the NTTPC.
In the United Kingdom, liberalization of equipment, supply and corporatization of BT had been
done two years prior to the process of privatization.
Deregulation
Deregulation denotes a policy of reducing or removing regulations that have been
imposed by local governments on industries or consumers (Petrazzini, 1995, p. 17; Straubhaar,
1995, p.3). By eliminating unnecessary regulations that, for the most part, have been put in
place for historical or political reasons, an increase in performance, greater freedom of choice,
and elimination of the cost of implementing regulations, are expected. Examples surveyed in
Chapter 3 are the deregulation of provision for customer premises equipment in the United
Sates in 1983, and the United Kingdom and Japan in 1985.
Liberalization
Liberalization is considered to be a special form of deregulation. While deregulation
denotes decreasing of regulations in general, liberalization means removal of the entry barrier
for industries (Petrazzini, 1995, p.16-17; Noam, 1995, pp.32-33). The policy of removing
the entry barrier to allow different companies to enter the market, is what is most often meant
by liberalization. Although full liberalization can rarely be seen, partial liberalization is
common. As we reviewed in Chapter 3, European countries, including France, Germany and
Spain, opened VAN markets to new entrants. Japan liberalized its long-distance, international,
satellite and mobile service markets in 1985.
Corporatization
Corporatization is the process of introducing corporate principles to public enterprise.
Usually, the mechanism of corporatization involves separating the enterprise from the
government body and granting independent status to the enterprise (The World Bank, 1995,
pp.40-41; Straubhaar, 1995, pp.24-26). Although a corporatized enterprise remains at least
initially in public hands, the enterprise is subject to law and regulations governing private
sectors, expecting increased managerial autonomy on the one hand, and decreased political
interference on the other. An example of corporatization is separation of BT from the Post
Office in 1981, as we described in Chapter 3.
Privatization
Privatization is the transformation of a public entity, which was formerly a government
agency or public corporation, into a private company (Petrazzini, 1995, p.16; Straubhaar,
1995, pp.19-24). As we saw in Chapter 3, one of the public corporations discussed, British
Telecom, was privatized in 1984 by selling its 51% stock to private sectors. By mid-1993, all
the government shares had been sold. Similarly, NTTPC became a private company in 1985.
Although it is said to be privatized, the Japanese government still holds 65.57% of all NTT
shares. Therefore we should be aware that the use of the term private covers a broad spectrum,
ranging from pure private to semi-private, as we discussed in section 4 of Chapter 2.
5.2 Lessons from History
In Chapter 3, we surveyed telecommunications development histories in several countries
mostly from industrialized countries. The survey showed significant diversity of regulations,
ownership and performance among countries.
Telephone infrastructure in the United States was developed by the Bell System. By
protecting itself by controlling key patents in the early years and later by refusing connections
requested by new entrants, the Bell System had preserved its monopoly status, in spite of
several antitrust challenges and other suits against it. After telecommunications development
had reached a mature level, the monopoly was finally broken up to introduce competition
mainly into the long-distance market. Competition in local telephony was made possible by the
recently passed Telecommunications Act of 1996.
In the United Kingdom, private operators did not perform well in the early period.
Nationalization of the telephone sector did not improve the situation markedly, because of the
government's indifference toward telephony. However, after World War II, telephone
networks expanded successfully, in spite of the internal inefficiency within the Post Office.
During the Thatcher administration, the telecommunications sector was separated from the Post
Office in 1981 and then privatized in 1984. Because a so-called duopoly policy, which
introduced limited competition into the telecommunications industry, was not successful at
stimulating the market, it was abolished in 1991. New entrants, mainly from the cable
television industry, were allowed to operate telephone service, expecting further competition.
In Japan, telecommunications had been developed by government initiative: before the
World War II by the government itself; and then by a public corporation. Overall, Japan's
telecommunications networks have been growing successfully, thanks to the government' s
recognition that telecommunications is indispensable for economic growth as well as overall
national development. Similar to the United Kingdom, internal inefficiency of NTTPC was
criticized. In 1985, NTTPC became a private company and new operators entered long-
distance, international and satellite communications markets.
The history of telephony in France is similar to that of the United Kingdom: initial private
development and later nationalization. Unlike the United Kingdom, as the French government
almost totally ignored the importance of telecommunications, the situation had long been poor
by the mid-1970s. However, after politicians came to be aware of the importance of
telecommunications, intensive investment was begun. As a result, now France has the most
advanced telecommunications infrastructure in the world.
German telecommunications is characterized by a traditional European PTT. Telephony
was developed by a public monopolist as in Japan. However, it had not successfully grown
compared to Japan, due to lack of financial autonomy; the revenue from telephony was not
always available to the telecommunications sector - sometimes it was used as a tool of
collecting revenue for the other sectors of the government. Aiming at increased autonomy,
DBP Telekom was corporatized in 1989. Privatization is to begin with the sale of shares in
Deutche Telekom in 1996.
Italy's telecommunications situation was different from other countries. Many separate
public entities, both operators and regulators, were poorly organized. Accordingly,
development of telecommunications infrastructure was not successful. Although it had been
long discussed, to consolidate the players was difficult. Finally, in 1994, Telecom Italia was
established to unite all the telephone operators in Italy.
Telecommunications in Spain was owned and operated by a private company called
Telef6nica. Contrary to the successful development by the private sector in the United States,
Spanish telephony developed slowly. It is due mainly to lack of financial autonomy and partly
to Spain' s geography.
Mexican telephony was initiated by foreign capital from the United States and Sweden.
They were later integrated into TELMEX and sold to the Mexican private sector in 1948.
Afterward, it was nationalized in 1972. TELMEX has performed well for the middle-income
country' s standard, both before and after nationalization. With the strong support of President
Salinas, TELMEX was re-privatized in 1988 and was intended to be a good advertisement of
the Salinas administration' s economic restructuring, rather than for improving performance.
The private sector led successful development of the networks in the United States, while
the French government's initiative finally achieved one of the most advanced
telecommunications infrastructures in the world. Although telephony in Germany was
developed by a government agency as in Japan, it had grown slowly because of less autonomy
in financial issues. Similarly, due mainly to lack of autonomy, Telef6nicain Spain seems not to
perform well, although it is a private company. The public telecommunications sector in Italy
has not worked efficiently either, due to fragmentation of the players of both the regulators and
business entities. In the case of TELMEX, nationalization did not effect on the performance of
the company.
As we observed, telecommunications development processes vary greatly from country
to country. No uniform explanation about a relationship between performance and institution,
organization and ownership would be possible. Successful countries employed approaches of
development that varied considerably. Similarly, reasons for failure cannot be explained in a
consistent manner.
5.3 Economic Performance Considerations
The economic characteristics that we surveyed in Chapter 2 imply that in the initial
development of telecommunications networks, some form of a subsidy is necessary to raise the
number of telephones to a critical mass level; due to a positive network externality, a required
subsidy is more than expected from the demand curve. The methods adopted by Japan justify
the necessity of a subsidy of some form or other: to foster initial development, those who paid
most were served first; after World War II, expensive one-time installation costs had been
required. Similarly, in Mexico, subscribers had to purchase TELMEX shares to support
network development.
In addition, because of a network externality, so-called universal service obligations are
necessary to extend telephone networks to unprofitable areas such as sparsely populated rural
regions or remote islands. Even with this obligation, universal service can hardly be
accomplished by a private enterprise. For instance, Telef6nica in Spain does not fully cover
remote villages with small population.
Natural monopolies cannot be justified, when the existence of economies of scale or
scope cannot be determined correctly. From the viewpoint of the telecommunications economy,
question of ownership does not have a clear-cut answer.
New technologies may alter the economic characteristics of telecommunications -
economies of scale or scope and sunk cost, which were regarded as reasons for entry
regulation, will be affected. Examples of such technologies are satellite communications,
cellular telephone, pager or VANs. It is better to allow new entrants into these non-basic
services, because economic efficiency can be achieved through competition rather than through
regulation.
Performance considerations in Chapter 4 suggest that, in general, telecommunications
development depends heavily on a country's GDP per capita rather than on its institutional or
organizational structure. If we look at this in detail, however, we find that among high income
countries, telecommunications situations considerably vary from country to country for
institutional, organizational and political reasons.
5.4 Recommendations for Developing Countries
As this thesis has shown, choice of ownership does not affect performance to the extent
that is widely believed. What is more important, is how the government fosters the
telecommunication enterprise regardless of its ownership. Accordingly, the choice of
privatization or corporatization might not be a matter of concern in so far as it determines
ownership, although we cannot ignore effects of such reforms on, for instance, financial issue.
However, public ownership could be justified, at least in the developmental stages of
telecommunications networks. As we surveyed, nationalization of the telecommunications
sector in France and the United Kingdom resulted in initial failure of the private provisions,
and initially the German government successfully ran a telephone enterprise. Moreover, even in
the later stage of network development, public ownership can be effective as we saw in the
case of Japan and France.
Introducing competition through liberalization and deregulation are effective measures, as
proven in the United States and Japan in the 1980s. Nevertheless, these events happened after
infrastructures reached a certain mature level. In the infancy stage, monopolistic provisions
should not be regarded as harmful.
We should also be aware that there will be potential risks involved in any reform. Since
many of the drastic reforms discussed were begun just some 15 years ago, we do not know
yet what will be the result of those attempts in industrialized countries. Additional reform
considerations and actual implementation in the United States, the United Kingdom or Japan
are proving that further adjustment of the policy is required, although initially the reforms were
considered a success. Before knowing the final answers, the solutions cannot be judged as
right.
In addition, private provisions might be harmful for early development, if strict
enforcement of universal service obligations by regulators is absent from the picture. As we
saw in Spain, Telef6nica has not covered less profitable or remote areas well. The Italian
government had to provide long-distance plus rural local service, instead of the private local
operators already in place in the profitable regions.
Finally, sometimes the logistical aspects of reform are hard to carry out or take a very
long time. As we reviewed, attempts at divestiture of the Bell System in the United States took
35 years since the antitrust challenge in 1949. The British Government had spent over a half
century to privatize its telecommunications entity, reacting to the complaints regarding its
inefficiency since the 1920s. Since 1982, there is talk of NTT' s break up in Japan, but it has
not come true so far. And we did not survey Thailand, Colombia and other developing
countries that failed to privatize their telecommunications entity due mainly to strong opposition
from employees, who would lose their advantageous positions as government officials
(Petrazzini, 1995, pp. 136-143).
Recognizing these findings and facts, we recommend that developing countries should
incorporate the following considerations in making or reforming telecommunications policy:
* separation of telecommunications entity from government body to assure managerial
and financial autonomy;
* isolation from political pressure to avoid abuse of the telecommunications sector as a
political device to attract public attention;
* introduction of business principles to decrease internal inefficiency, caused by X-
inefficiency and managerial slack; and
* avoiding radical changes including privatization, carried out in the most industrialized
countries, which already reached a mature level of telecommunications development.
To achieve these objectives, we suggest that creating a public corporation is a good
choice, as several examples show its effectiveness, although it may appear to be modest.
In addition, a government's attitude to telecommunications is important. It should be
recognized that telecommunications is a necessity for both people's daily life and business
activities, not a luxury only for the rich. In terms of technology, developing countries have an
advantage - most advanced technologies are readily available. Developing countries should
not hesitate to introduce new means of telecommunications, such as satellite communications or
cellular telephone, although a regulatory framework has to be properly designed.
Since Bell's invention of the telephone in 1876, it took more than a century to
accomplish universal service by monopolists in most industrialized countries. Adopting any
type of reform, after a certain level of network development is reached, is never too late. What
is necessary for developing countries is to review and adopt successful cases of early
development stages of telecommunications sectors in the industrialized countries, rather than
simply adopt post-developed stages. Reforms are not likely to improve the situation, unless
they are done at the right moment and in the proper manner.

Bibliography
Armstrong, M., Cowan, S., & Vickers, J. (1994). Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis
and British Experience. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Bohlin, E. (1993). Telecommunications Liberalization in Sweden 1980-1993: An Over View.
In Christoffersen, M., & Henten A. (Eds.). Telecommunications:Limits toDeregulation?.
Amsterdam: IOS Press.
Brock, G. W.(1994). Telecommunications Policy for the Information Age: From Monopoly to
Competition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Cullis, J. G., & Jones, P. R. (1987). Microeconomics and the Public Economy: A Defense of
Leviathan. New York: Basil Blackwell.
de Neufville, R. (1990). Applied System Analysis: Engineering Planning and Technology
Management. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Duch, R. M. (1991). Privatizing the Economy: Telecommunications Policy in Comparative
Perspective. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Financial Times. (1994, August 18). p.15.
Fukui, K. (1992). Japanese National Railways Privatization Study: The experience ofJapan
and Lessons for Developing Countries (World Bank Discussion Papers No. 172).
Washington DC: The World Bank.
International Telecommunication Union. (1972). Year Book of Common Carrier
Telecommunications Statistics. Geneva: Author.
International Telecommunication Union. (1984). Year Book of Common Carrier
Telecommunications Statistics. (11th ed.). Geneva: Author.
International Telecommunication Union. (1992). Year Book of Common Carrier
Telecommunications Statistics. (19th ed.). Geneva: Author.
International Telecommunication Union. (1995). World Telecommunication Development
Report. Genbva: Author.
Ito, Y., & Iwata, A. (1994). Japan: Creating the Domestic and International Networks. In E.
Noam, S. Komatsuzaki & D. A. Conn (Eds.). Telecommunications in the Pacific Basin:
An Evolutionary Approach (pp. 440-457). New York: Oxford University Press.
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. (1995). Telecommunications White Paper. Tokyo:
Office of Publishing of Ministry of Finance.
Mody, B., Bauer, J. M.,& Straubhaar, J. D. (1995). Telecommunications Politics. Mahwah:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
The New York Times. (1996, April 22). p.A1, p.D5.
Noam, E. M. (1994). Beyond Telecommunications Liberalization: Past Performance, Present
Hype and Future Direction. In W. J. Drake (Ed.). The New Information Infrastructure:
Strategies for U.S. Policy (pp. 31-54). New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press.
Noam. E. M. (1995). The United States. In E. Noam, S. Komatsuzaki, & D. A. Conn (Eds.).
Telecommunications in the Pacific Basin: An Evolutionary Approach (pp.473-490). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1990). Performance Indicators for
Public Telecommunications Operators. Paris: Author.
Oslin, G. P. (1992). The Story of Telecommunications. Macon: Mercer University Press.
Petrazzini, B. A. (1995). The Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform in Developing
Countries: Privatization andLiberalization in comparative Perspective. Westport: Prager
Publishers.
Pindyck, R. S., & Rubinfeld, D. L. (1994). Microeconomics (3rd ed.), Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall.
Ramamurti, R. (1996). Telephone Privatization in a Large Country: Mexico. In R. Ramamurti
(Ed.), Privatizing Monopolies: Lessons from the Telecommunications and Transport
Sectors in Latin America (pp.72-107). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Saunders, R. J., Warford, J. J., & Wellenius, B. (1994). Telecommunications and Economic
Development (2nd ed.). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Sharkey, W. W. (1982), The Theory of Natural Monopoly. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Stehmann, O. (1995). Network Competition for European Telecommunications. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Straubhaar, J. D. (1995). From PTT to Private: Liberalization and Privatization in Eastern
Europe and the Third World. In B. Mody, J. M. Bauer & J. D. Straubhaar (Eds.)
Telecommunications Politics: Ownership and Control oflnformation Highway in
Developing Countries (pp.3-30). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Takano, Y. (1992). Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Privatization Study: Experience ofJapan
and Lessons for Developing Countries (World Bank Discussion Papers No. 179).
Washington DC: The World Bank.
Telecom Italia (1996, April 29). Letter to the Stockholders. Rome: Author.
Telecommunications Council. (Japan) (1996). Report on the "Status of Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation".
Vickers, J., & Yarrow, G. (1988). Privatization: An Economic Analysis. Cambridge: The MIT
Press.
Wellenius, B., & Stern, P. A. (Eds.) (1994). Implementing Reforms in the
Telecommunications Sector: Lessons from Experience. Washington DC: The World
Bank.
The World Bank. (1994). World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development.
New York: Oxford University Press.
The Yomiuri Shimbun. (1996a, April 1). p.6 .
The Yomiuri Shimbun. (1996b, April 7). p.1.
